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Segregating Schools: The Foreseeable
Consequences of Tuition Tax Credits
Declining private school enrollments and the perceived failure of
public schools to educate children effectively1 have spurred interest in
restructuring American education to permit greater freedom of choice.2
The Ninety-fifth Congress extensively debated one proposal generated
by this expanding discourse on educational alternatives: federal income
tax credits for tuition payments to nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools.3 Congressional debate focused on the constitutionality of the
tuition tax credit under the establishment clause of the First Amend-
ment. The legislation's effect on the racial composition of the nation's
public school systems was considered only as a secondary policy argu-
ment with which to challenge the bill.
This Note argues, however, that the segregative effect of the pro-
1. From 1966 to 1976, the number of students enrolled in private schools declined
from 13% of all students to 9.8%, and the number of private schools declined by 10%.
124 CONG. REc. H4734-35 (daily ed. June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Frenzel). Although
total private school enrollments have been dwindling since 1965, see, e.g., 0. KRAUSHAAR,
AMERICAN NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS: PATTERNS OF DIVERsITY 12-17 (1972), recent data indicates
that the -trend actually represents massive losses in Catholic school enrollments, while
non-Catholic private schools have resisted or reversed the declining trend, Erickson, Nault,
& Cooper, Recent Enrollment Trends in U.S. Nonpublic Schools, in DECLINING ENROLL-
MENTS: THE CHALLENGE OF THE COMING DECADE 81, 121 (S. Abramowitz & S. Rosenfeld
eds. 1978) [book hereinafter cited as DECLINING ENROLLMENTS]. During the same time
period, the failures and problems of public schools were discussed by numerous com-
mentators. See, e.g., S. BOWLEs & H. GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA (1976) (educa-
tion system unresponsive to individual differences and to preexisting job horizons of
students); J. COLEMAN, YOUTH: TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD (1974) (schools fail to provide
effective transition to employment).
2. Suggestions have included changing curriculum and teaching methods, decentralizing
public school systems to increase parental and local control, and fostering competition for
public schools by creating free community schools, providing state-funded education
vouchers, and state aid to parochial schools. See, e.g., Areen, Education Vouchers, 6 HAnv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 466, 466-69 (1971); Erickson, Strategies for Preserving Education, in
NONPUBLIC SCHOOL AID 124, 130 n.1 (E. West ed. 1976).
3. See Vanik Amendment to H.R. 12050, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H4765
(daily ed. June 1, 1978). The amendment was adopted by the House of Representatives by
a 209 to 194 vote. Id. at H4785. There were extensive Committee hearings on the tuition
tax credit legislation. See Tuition Tax Relief Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Tax Treatment of Tuition Expenses:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). H.R.
12050 included a credit for college and post-secondary vocational school tuition, which
also was adopted by the Senate. 124 CONG. REC. S13,387 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978). This
Note will not consider the legislation's impact on higher education. Unless otherwise in-
dicated, the term "tuition tax credit" will refer only to elementary and secondary school
credits.
HeinOnline -- 89 Yale L.J. 168 1979-1980
Tax Credits
posed tuition tax credit creates serious constitutional objections under
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 4 To establish dis-
criminatory intent, the Note adopts a standard of proof based on the
foreseeable consequences of the legislation. After assessing the credit's
disproportionate racial impact on schools, the Note evaluates the credit's
constitutionality under the foreseeability standard and concludes that
the legislation should not be reintroduced without substantial revision.
The Note then suggests that Congress consider implementing a system
of education vouchers as a constitutional alternative that would achieve
the same goals as tax credits.
I. Legislative Background to the Proposed Tuition Tax Credit
Although tuition tax credit proposals have been adopted by the
Senate with increasing frequency since the late 1960's, 5 similar legisla-
tion had continually failed to reach the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives.6 In 1978, however, the House held its first floor debate on
tuition tax credits, and subsequently adopted H.R. 12050, the Tuition
Tax Credit Act of 1978, 7 which provided nonrefundable income tax
credits for tuition payments made to elementary and secondary schools
and to institutions of higher education.8 The bill established a credit
equal to twenty-five percent of tuition, per student, with a maximum
allowable credit of $100 for primary education and $250 for higher
education.9
When the Senate considered the bill, it deleted the provision for
elementary and secondary school credits. 10 The Conference Committee
proposed a compromise on the inclusion of credits for secondary school
4. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes the same constitutional
standard on the federal government as that applied to the states under the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
Therefore, this Note refers interchangeably to the equal protection clause and its
equivalent guarantee under the due process clause.
5. The Senate has approved six education tax credit bills, all for tuition at institutions
of higher education, since 1967. See 123 CONG. Rac. S18,803 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1977); 122
CONG. RaEc. S16,005 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976); 122 CONG. REc. S13,568, S13,588-89 (daily ed.
Aug. 5, 1976); 117 CONG. REC. 41,312 (1971); 115 CONG. REc. 37,305 (1969); 113 CONG. REC.
9688 (1967).
6. More than 100 tuition tax credit bills, introduced in the House, have died in com-
mittee during the 1970's. See, e.g., 1975-76 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 252 (94th Cong.) (49 bills);
1973-74 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 119, 252 (93d Cong.) (99 bills); 1971-72 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 247-
48, 314 (92d Cong.) (75 bills).
7. H.R. 12050, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H4799 (daily ed. June 1, 1978).
8. See 124 CONG. REc. H4765 (daily ed. June 1, 1978).
9. See id.
10. 124 CONG. REC. S13,359 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978) (adopting Hollings Unprinted
Amendment No. 1655).
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education,11 but both the House and Senate rejected the proposal,
and the entire credit package was recommitted in the final days of the
Ninety-fifth Congress.' 2 In the current congressional session, numerous
members have again introduced bills proposing tuition tax credits,'
3
but none has yet reached the floor of the House or Senate.
Sponsors of the tuition tax credit argued that the legislation would
advance the fundamental values of pluralism and choice in American
education.' 4 They contended that, by offering parents alternatives to
public schools, tax credits would stem declining private school enroll-
ments and thus maintain the vitality of a diverse private educational
sector.' 5 Concentrating on the constitutionality of tuition tax credits
under the establishment clause of the First Amendment,", opponents
charged that the credit would have the constitutionally impermissible
effect of advancing religion because the vast majority of nonpublic
elementary and secondary schools are affiliated with religious institu-
tions.1
7
11. See H.R. REP. No. 1790, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7 (1978).
12. 124 CONG. REG. S19,144 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. at H12,612 (daily
ed. Oct. 12, 1978). President Carter had indicated that he would veto any tuition tax
credit legislation. See Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1978, at 6, col. 2. He offered an alternative aid
package, which Congress adopted, the Middle Income Student Assistance Act, Pub. L. No.
95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978) (increasing aid to middle-income families for college tuition),
and the Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2143 (1978) (expand-
ing current aid programs to nonpublic schools). Supporters of the tax credit legislation
emphasized that they intend to make the credit an issue in the 1980 presidential election
if it is not passed this year. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. S13,112 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (state-
ment of Sen. Ribicoff); Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 329 (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
The tax credit concept for aid to nonpublic schools had been endorsed in the 1976 cam-
paign platforms of both political parties. See 123 CONG. REC. S8054 (daily ed. May 19, 1977)
(Democratic party: commitment to providing tax aid for education to ensure parental free-
dom of choice; Republican party: favors tax credits for elementary and secondary school
tuition).
13. Forty-eight proposals for tuition tax credits are currently pending in the 96th
Congress. Telephone Conversations with staff of Senate Comm. on Finance and House
Comm. on Ways & Means, Sept. 25, 1979 (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
14. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REG. S13,113 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (statement of Sen. Pack-
wood) (legislation preserves educational choice and pluralism); 124 CONG. REc. H4736
(daily ed. June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Frenzel) (more choices for educational con-
sumers).
15. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. S13,107-08 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (statement of Sen.
Ribicoff); 124 CONG. REG. H4735 (daily ed. June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Frenzel).
16. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. S13,336-40 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978) (statement of Sen. Scott);
124 CONG. REC. S13,206-11 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1978) (statement of Sen. Hollings); Weber,
Building on Sand: Supreme Court Construction and Educational Tax Credits, 12 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 531 (1979) (constitutional issues centered on establishment clause).
17. About 85% of the nation's nonpublic elementary and secondary schools are reli-
giously affiliated. Memorandum from Attorney General Griffin Bell to Joseph A. Califano,
Jr., Secretary of Department of Health, Education and Welfare 4 (March 17, 1978) (on file
with Yale Law Journal). The Supreme Court has held that legislation violates the estab-
lishment clause of the First Amendment if it has no secular purpose, has the primary
170
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Additional challenges to tuition tax credits were advanced in order to
supplement the constitutional argument. Some members of Congress
emphasized the fiscal problems generated by the credit's high costs.' 8
Others voiced complaints on civil rights grounds based on the credit's
segregative effect on schools.19 They contended that the legislation
would foster segregation or resegregation by facilitating the exit of
middle-class white families from urban public school systems into
private segregated academies. However, the opponents who expressed
this concern over the credit's impact on the racial composition of the
nation's schools raised only public policy, rather than constitutional,
objections.20 A more thorough evaluation of the tuition tax credit
legislation under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment would
have established the credit's vulnerability to an equal protection
challenge and demonstrated that, as drafted, it could not constitution-
ally have been enacted.
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or will result in excessive government entangle-
ment with religion. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1977); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The argument against the credit centers on the
second prong, the "effects test" criterion. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)
(invalidating instructional equipment and materials loan program for impermissible ef-
fects); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(invalidating provisions for maintenance repairs allowance and tuition grants and tax de-
ductions to parents for impermissible effects). State tuition tax credit programs have been
found unconstitutional by numerous courts following Nyquist. See, e.g., Public Funds for
Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.), aff'd,
99 S. Ct. 2818 (1979); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd sub
norn. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). But cf. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v.
Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978) (upholding tuition tax deduction program in
which parents of both public and nonpublic school children participate). Examining these
precedents, Attorney General Bell concluded that the tuition tax credit for elementary and
secondary schools violated the establishment clause. See Memorandum, supra. But cf. Note,
Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State: Tuition Tax Credits, 92
HARv. L. R v. 696 (1979) (arguing for constitutionality of federal tuition tax credits under
establishment clause).
Supporters of the tax credit distinguish Nyquist on the basis of a footnote in that case,
413 U.S. at 782-83 n.38 (suggesting statute may be permissible if broader class of bene-
ficiaries). They noted that when elementary, secondary, and college credits are combined
in one program, nonsectarian schools will receive 75% of the bill's total benefits, S. REP.
No. 642, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), instead of 15% if elementary and secondary schools
are considered separately, Memorandum, sup ra, at 4.
18. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. S13,343-46 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978) (statements of Sen.
Muskie); id. at S13,341 (statement of Sen. Bentsen). The estimated cost of the credit for
elementary and secondary schools is substantial: $9 million in fiscal year 1978, $218
million in fiscal 1979, $354 million in fiscal 1980, $310 million in fiscal 1981. 124 CONG.
REc. H4765 (daily ed. June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Vanik).
19. See, e.g., 124 CONG. Rac. S13,124 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (statement of Sen. Stafford);
124 CONG. REc. H4757 (daily ed. June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Mitchell (Md.)).
20. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. H4757 (daily ed. June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Mitchell
(Md.)) (objecting that bill opens door for resegregation of public schools); id. at H4749
(statement of Rep. Anderson) (objecting on policy grounds that bill threatens to promote
segregation).
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II. Fulfilling the Intent Requirement Under the
Equal Protection Clause
In Washington v. Davis,21 the Supreme Court held that in order to
find governmental actions in violation of the equal protection clause
there must be proof of discriminatory intent.2 2 But Davis left am-
biguous the standard of proof for intent. Subsequently, in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,23 the
Court sought to clarify the standard by identifying several criteria that
could establish the forbidden intent.24 None of those factors would
have sufficiently demonstrated intent in the case of the tuition tax
credit, 25 which may have contributed to congressional failure to con-
sider the relationship between the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection and the racially segregative effect of the credit. This past
Term, however, while reviewing two school desegregation decisions,
the Court upheld as a valid criterion of intent the use of objective
evidence in the form of the foreseeably segregative consequences of
governmental decisions. 26 Consideration of this type of evidence can
effectively establish a case against the credit.
A. Development of the Foreseeability Standard of Proof
In analyzing the tax credit legislation, the standard for intent applied
in school desegregation decisions provides the appropriate legal frame-
work. The decision to enact tuition tax credits raises the same con-
stitutional and policy issues that are raised by a school board's selection
of a school site or a student assignment plan: both decisions directly
21. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
22. Id. at 239-40.
23. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
24. Id. at 266-68. The Court indicated three factors: otherwise unexplained systematic
and strikingly disproportionate racial impact; evidence in legislative histories indicating
a historical background of invidious motivation; and departures from normal procedures
in the sequence of decisional events.
25. The impact of the credit is not as striking as that found in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (ordinance administered only against Asian Americans), and Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (irregular districting eliminated black voters from city),
cases that the Arlington Heights Court used to illustrate its first evidentiary criterion.
429 U.S. at 266. The legislative history does not indicate a historical background of in-
vidious motivation specific to the tax credit, nor was there anything unusual in the
procedures followed by Congress in debating the tax credit that suggest discriminatory
intent. Cf. Note, The Role of Circumstantial Evidence in Proving Discriminatory Intent:
Developments Since Washington v. Davis, 19 B.C. L. REv. 795, 804-05 (1978) (in school de-
segregation cases, direct evidence of departures from normal procedures and racially
motivated statements by officials will be minimal).
26. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 n.9 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2950 (1979).
Vol. 89: 168, 1979
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affect, and seek to influence, the enrollment patterns of public schools.2 1
In addition, in school desegregation decisions, courts had to fashion a
standard for intent applicable to governmental entities whose action or
inaction resulted in pronounced segregative effects without express
indication of discriminatory motivation.28 Tuition tax credits involve
the same problematic combination of institutional defendant, effects
and motivation. 29 Thus, tuition tax credit legislation and segregative
school board action demand a similar judicial response.
The formulative Supreme Court decisions in school desegregation lit-
igation developed an approach to intent that stresses the effects of school
board practices; from these opinions, many lower courts extracted
the theoretical basis for utilizing evidence of foreseeability to prove
intent.30 Thus, the progression of the principal school desegregation
decisions implementing Brown v. Board of Education,al from Green
v. County School Board32 through Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education33 and Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver,
Colorado,3 4 reflected an increasing focus by the Supreme Court on the
objective effects of school board decisions rather than on the school
board's subjective intent.3 5 In these cases, the Court progressively
relied on segregative patterns in school attendance to find intent
27. See pp. 184-87 infra (discussing credit's actual and intended effect on enrollment
patterns). Because of these effects, the tax credit implicates, as fully as school board
policies, the constitutional prohibition of segregated schools first expressed by the Court
in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. See pp. 177-78 infra.
29. See pp. 184-89 infra.
30. Lower courts have not always been consistent in their use of evidence of foreseeably
segregative consequences. Some courts have held that foreseeability created a presumption
of intent. See, e.g., United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 565 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). Others have declared foreseeability itself to be
the standard of intent. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 860 (1978); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 167-69 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 3106 (1979). Still others have considered foreseeability as one
form of evidence to prove intent. See, e.g., Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp.
229, 255 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2950 (1979). It was the last formulation of
foresecability that the Supreme Court adopted when it chose to review the applicable in-
tent standard for school desegregation cases. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct.
2941, 2950 (1979); pp. 174-76 infra (discussing Columbus and companion case Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) ("freedom of choice" assignment plan rejected despite plan's
nonracial criteria for student assignment because it preserved segregated attendance
patterns of former dual school system).
33. 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971) (past discrimination sufficient to show intent behind current
segregated attendance patterns set by racially neutral assignment plans).
34. 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973) (covert past discrimination sufficient to show intent).
35. See Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHILosoPHY &
PUB. AFF. 3, 18-26 (1974) (analyzing movement toward an effects test through desegregation
cases).
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rather than on explicit racial assignment policies. Although it has
been argued that the Court imposed limitations on the develop-
ment of this effects-centered test in Milliken v. Bradley,30 that case
addressed the formulation of a remedy and not the standard for in-
tent.3 7 In fact, the Milliken Court affirmed3  the district court's find-
ing that the "natural, foreseeable and actual effect" of the govern-
mental actions involved was to encourage racially segregated demo-
graphic patterns and to create and maintain segregated schools.3 9
These major school desegregation decisions thus implied an effects
test; lower courts adopted a foreseeability standard that incorporated
this test by inferring discriminatory intent from proof that the fore-
seeable consequences of a decision were likely to have a segregative
effect.40 Although commentators questioned whether foreseeability
was acceptable evidence under the intent requirement of Washington
v. Davis,4 1 most courts responded by continuing to apply, or by newly
36. 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see Fiss, supra note 35, at 31 (discussing limitations imposed
by Milliken).
37. The Milliken Court, in effect, refused to expand its formulation of intent over
time-from past to present-into geographical space-from city to suburb-which would
allow for an inter-district remedy as well as an intra-district solution. See 418 U.S. at
744-45. This limitation also was reflected in the recent case of Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). However, the Court's continued concern with effects is
still apparent in its construction of a standard for relief in Dayton; it held that district
courts must determine the "incremental segregative effect" of the government's violation
in formulating a remedy. 433 U.S. at 420. Furthermore, application of a foresceability test
for intent may lead to the same result that the Court reached in Milliken, because the
segregation was not foreseeable when the boundary lines between the city and suburbs
were drawn.
38. 418 U.S. at 738 n.18.
39. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 939-40 (E.D. Mich. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
40. The standard is derived by analogy to the tort concept of foreseeable intent: a
person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his actions. See W. PROSSER,
LAw OF ToRTs § 8 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, Comments a & b
(1965). The tort standard was first adapted to equal protection analysis by Professor Fiss,
whose standard -'vas not rebuttable. See Fiss, supra note 35, at 15-16 (foresecability standard
of intent applied to school board neighborhood assignment plans). In equal protection
cases, this concept has functioned as a rebuttable presumption rather than as an un-
challenged rule. However, the Supreme Court does not consider proof of foresecability
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of intent that would shift the burden of proof
to the defendant school board. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 n.9
(1979).
Both the use of intent in the earlier school desegregation cases and the foreseeabiIity
standard trigger consideration of intent in conjunction with an examination of segregative
effects. For example, the Court's analysis in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971), resembles subsequent judicial examination of neighborhood assignment
plans and school site selection under the foresceability standard. Id. at 20-21 (choice of
school location, by influencing residential patterns, creates or maintains segregated
system).
41. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1041 (1978) (suggesting Supreme
Court had rejected foreseeability standard); Eisenberg, DisProportionate Impact and
Illicit Motive, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 50 n.76 (1977) (same).
174
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adopting, the foreseeability standard in school desegregation cases
decided after Davis.
42
After declining numerous opportunities to review lower court usage
of evidence of foreseeability, 43 the Supreme Court expressly recognized
its applicability this past Term. In Columbus Board of Education v.
Penick44 and the companion case Dayton Board of Education v. Brink-
man,45 the Court held that proof of the foreseeable consequences of
school board acts or omissions was relevant evidence for establishing
discriminatory intent.40 In addition to adopting an objective eviden-
tiary standard for intent, the Court in these two cases upheld findings
that Brown imposed an affirmative duty on school boards whose dis-
tricts were actually segregated in 1954 to disestablish dual school sys-
tems.47 For such school boards, evidence of foreseeability alone can
42. The Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits have continued to apply the foreseeability
standard since Davis. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 860 (1978) (reaffirming earlier application of foreseeability standard); United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 167-69 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
3106 (1979) (same); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977) (same). Prior to Davis, the First Circuit applied the foresee-
ability standard in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 963 (1975); Morgan has not been overruled. The Seventh Circuit recently adopted the
foreseeability standard in dictum. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d
400, 413 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978). The Eighth Circuit has employed a
foreseeable-effects presumption since Davis that shifts the burden of proof to the de-
fendant when there are foreseeably segregative effects. See United States v. School Dist. of
Omaha, 565 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). Thus, six
circuits have accepted some form of the foreseeability standard.
43. See note 42 supra (citing cases denying certiorari).
44. 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979).
45. 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979).
46. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 n.9 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2950 (1979).
47. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 2979-80 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2947-48 (1979). In both cases, the Court upheld findings
of discriminatory intent on the part of school boards in districts that had not been
segregated by law at the time desegregation was mandated by Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). The lower courts had found that the boards were operating officially
segregated systems in 1954 despite the absence of a legislative mandate or authorization.
The Supreme Court's affirmance indicates that all systems that were racially imbalanced
in 1954 through some intentional action by a school official, regardless of statutory
sanction, are dual school systems within the meaning of Brown. See Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2946 n.5 (1979) (intentional acts sufficient to establish
existence of dual systems). All southern school systems and probably most systems outside
the South were segregated in this sense in 1954. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
REPORT 1959, at 166, 245, 256-60 (17 southern states and District of Columbia segregated
by statute; 4 non-southern states permissively segregated by statute; practices and patterns
of segregation in other states discussed); Clotfelter, The Implications of "Resegregation"
for Judicially Imposed School Desegregation Remedies, 31 VAND. L. REV. 829, 831 (1978) (a
majority of black students in 8 of 9 urban districts in non-southern states attended
schools 90-1007o black in 1950 and 1960). Obtaining official data on the racial composition
of non-southern schools for the 1950-60 period is difficult because of the general policy of
government agencies not to record by race. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 2 1961
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demonstrate a board's failure to fulfill its duty under Brown.4s These
cases continued the trend toward an effects test because the concept of
an affirmative duty under Brown serves to shift the triggering element
of unconstitutionality away from "intent," as a specific current in-
vidious purpose, to "effects," the continuous presence of patterns of
racial imbalance that are the consequence of pre-1954 actions.
Because foreseeable impact alone is insufficient to establish intent,40
additional factors, such as notice to the defendant of the effects of his
actions, 50 must be weighed. The Supreme Court did not specify in
Columbus what particular additional evidence made the finding of
impermissible intent conclusive. Most lower courts have focused on
the availability of less segregative options for decisionmakers in order
to hold that evidence of foreseeability was sufficient to prove intent.,'
REPORT-EDUCATION 99 (reports few but data clear as to segregation). The evidence is clear
that in 1965 most American children attended segregated schools, J. COLEMAN ET AL.,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 3 (1966), and this segregative trend has been
increasing, see pp. 184-85 infra. Reports have outlined how apparent "de facto" segrega-
tion in non-southern districts was purposeful segregation during the time frame of
Brown. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, I RACIAL IsOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
42-59 (1967) [hereinafter cited as RACIAL ISOLATION]; M. WEINBERG, RACE AND PLACE: A
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL 34-36, 73-75, 91 (1967). Therefore, virtually
all school boards today are operating under an affirmative duty to desegregate. Newly
created systems also bear the Brown duty when they impinge upon the desegregation of
former dual systems. See United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484,
489 (1972). In addition, the 25-year reach of violations upheld in Dayton and Columbus
convincingly nullifies the holding in Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424
(1976), that despite evident failure to achieve a unitary school system, a school board's
implementation of a desegregation plan six years earlier satisfactorily eliminated the
constitutional violation.
48. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 n.9 (1979). Findings of
current racial imbalance establish failure to fulfill the Brown duty. Although evidence of
foreseeability is sufficient to prove breach of the "affirmative duty" of Brown, it cannot
of itself prove discriminatory intent. Id. Thus the Court does not link use of foresee-
ability to a finding of discrimination in 1954. Proof of foreseeability is correspondingly
not restricted to school boards that have institutional continuity with acts and intentions
at the time of Brown, but extends to legislatures. See pp. 177-83 infra.
49. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2950 (1979).
50. See Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 240, 255-57 (S.D. Ohio
1977), affd, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979). Notice consisted of "repeatedly and articulately vocalized
concern, anger or dismay concerning both overtly segregative action and lost integrative
opportunities" by black parents and civic organizations. Id. at 255. Evidence that current
efforts of school boards will not substantially cure racial imbalance and that the use of
neighborhood schools encourages residential segregation may also support the inference
of intent. Id. at 257-60.
51. See, e.g., Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817, 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (foresee-
ability includes overlooking less segregative options). Many lower courts required the
defendant school authorities to prove absence of less segregative alternatives when the
plaintiff demonstrated foreseeability. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 143 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978). The standard of proof applied in this Note requires
evidence of alternatives to be produced by the plaintiff and not the defendant. This
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This suggests that the existence of reasonable alternatives for meet-
ing a permissible goal with less segregative effect, in conjunction
with evidence of notice and foreseeability, establishes discriminatory
intent.
5 2
B. Application of Proof of Foreseeability to Legislative Bodies
Although courts in school desegregation cases were not applying the
foreseeability standard to legislative decisions, the same purposes and
policies underlie applicability of evidence of foreseeability to legisla-
tures as led to its use against education authorities. Courts developed
the foreseeability standard for proof of intent in order to cope with
the difficulty of ascertaining the subjective intent of a multimember
entity such as a school board or state educational agency. A subjective
analysis of intent considers only the motivation of individual officials.53
Such a standard imposes a nearly impossible evidentiary burden when
applied to an institutional defendant because of the difficulty of dis-
standard was adopted by the Supreme Court when it rejected a presumption of intent
based on foreseeable effects. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct 2971, 2978
n.9 (1979).
52. The Supreme Court's rejection of foreseeability functioning as a presumption in
Dayton was based on a refusal by the Court to shift the burden of proof to the defendant
and not on the nature of the evidence required for rebuttal. See 99 S. Ct. at 2978 n.9
(no warrant for holding foreseeability routinely shifts burden of persuasion). When the
burden remains with the plaintiff to prove the existence of less segregative alternatives,
the Court's objection is met.
When decisions result in foreseeable segregation and that outcome could easily be
avoided by adopting readily available alternative programs, the inference of intentional
segregation is strong. Cf. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (requiring
district court to consider school board's chosen course of action "in light of any alternatives
which may be shown as feasible and more promising in their effectiveness. [When] . . .
other more promising courses of action [are open to the board, that] may indicate a lack
of good faith; and at the least it places a heavy burden upon the board to explain its
preference for an apparently less effective method."); Note, Reading the Mind of the
School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317,
338 (1976) (institutional intent test involves consideration of foreseeable consequences of
decision and of less segregative alternative means for fulfilling educational goals). When
further evidence is presented of the defendant's knowledge of foreseeably segregative con-
sequences and of available alternatives, the case for intent is complete. The cumulative
evidence of intent in Columbus consisted of analogous data: proof of foreseeability and
notice and an assessment of the board's recent efforts and new programs in terms of
whether they "substantially" cured racial imbalance. 429 F. Supp. 229, 255-60 (S.D. Ohio
1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979). The court specifically found the existence of less segrega-
tive alternatives for the selection of school sites, and used that finding to infer intent. Id.
at 240, 242-43.
53. See, e.g., Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 488 F.2d 579, 587-88 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974) (individual motivation required in applying
subjective standard to school board); Husbands v. Pennsylvania, 395 F. Supp. 1107, 1133
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (same).
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cerning a collective will from the disparate motives of individuals and
because plaintiffs rarely have access to evidence or direct knowledge of
the actors' motives.54 These problems are magnified when the institu-
tion under scrutiny is a state legislature or Congress, both of which are
far more complex decisionmakers than an educational agency. 55
The foreseeability standard, like other objective methods of proof,56
54. See Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh,
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 725, 733-34 (1977) (discussing problems of subjective intent
standard); Note, supra note 52, at 322-27 (same).
The subjective test raises additional conceptual problems. Should continuing intent be
ascribed even as the individual members change? How should the multiple intentions of
various actors be evaluated? What should be the consequences of mixed motives? See
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 115-31 (suggesting strict scrutiny when illicit motive is one
of many motives). Because this formulation does not indicate at what point the presence of
mixed motives can or should be recognized, it gives only ambiguous content to the sub-
jective standard it prescribes. Moreover, even when required to apply a subjective standard,
courts may feel constrained not to evaluate motivations of individual officers due to
traditional judicial reluctance to question the motivation of legislators. See Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977).
55. Congress or a state legislature has many more individual decisionmakers and more
varied permissible objectives than does a school board.
56. Other objective standards that courts have applied include the "pattern or prac-
tice" test, which weighs evidence of repeated or cumulative violations of the equal pro-
tection clause; an "impact-plus" test, which looks for disproportionate racial impact plus
some of the factors mentioned in Arlington Heights, see Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo,
564 F.2d 126, 142-44 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978) (housing discrimina-
tion); and the Omaha presumption, which shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant
after the plaintiff produces evidence of foreseeably segregative impact, see United States
v. School Dist. of Omaha, 565 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064
(1978). One writer has developed an institutional intent standard that focuses on educa-
tional objectives. See Note, supra note 52. This test charges the government with knowledge
of the foreseeable consequences of alternative policies and requires the selection of the
least segregative means to legitimate ends. Id. at 337-38.
Objective intent tests such as evidence of foreseeable consequences have been criticized
for collapsing the Supreme Court's distinction between de jure and de facto segregation.
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 54, at 732-33; Note, supra note 52, at 330-32. Courts apply-
ing the foreseeability standard, however, insisted that the distinction was maintained both
because foreseeability required a two-step showing of the existence of a foreseeably segrega-
tive pattern and of its conscious anticipation, and because it was rebuttable. See, e.g.,
Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978). Thus,
racially disproportionate impact is used as evidence of intent under the foresecability
standard, whereas in other contexts impact alone is a per se harm. Cf. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (disproportionate impact without purpose
demonstrates employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964). Furthermore, the recent Dayton and Columbus decisions have blunted the force of
this criticism of foreseeability. These decisions represent the Court's clear recognition of
the crucial and valid role of objective evidence of intent in school desegregation cases.
In addition, by positing a continuing, affirmative duty on school boards to desegregate
without regard to direct evidence of current intent or prior statutory segregation, see note
47 supra, if the school system was segregated in 1954, the Court has cast a wide and
comprehensive net over school districts that can be found in violation. Because most school
districts were segregated at the time of Brown, see note 47 supra, these decisions have
effectively attenuated the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation.
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shifts the evidentiary focus from the thought processes of the continually
changing membership of a decisionmaking body to the actions of the
collective unit. This type of evidence is not only more accessible to
plaintiffs than that required to prove subjective intent,57 but also is
better suited for evaluating the decisions of a multimember entity. It
recognizes that institutional intent is an aggregate of all the individual
purposes and thus can be calibrated only through institutional action,
the sole visible expression of the unit's intent.
Judicial deference to Congress does not require adopting a standard
of proof of intent for tax credits different from that applied to state
school boards. The affirmative duty of school boards to desegregate
relied on in Columbus and Dayton restricts the scope of permissible
legislative action that affects schools. If legislators were able to pursue
policies directly contravening desegregation plans, or policies whose
effects indirectly did so, school boards would be frustrated in fulfilling
their duty to eliminate dual schools, and court orders enforcing desegre-
gation plans could be nullified.58 Courts could not uphold such legisla-
tive programs without rendering Brown an illusory promise.59 Guided
57. The subjective test requires evidence of what went on in the mind of the individual
officials; the foreseeability test utilizes only public, objective data, such as attendance and
residential patterns. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142-45 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978) (discussing difficulties of establishing intent under subjective
standard and adducing clear evidence of discriminatory intent of school authorities under
objective, foreseeability standard).
The shift away from subjective evidence also enables a court to develop uniform guide-
lines and standards to govern cases, thereby avoiding the endemic empirical problems
raised by a subjective mode of analysis. See Comment, supra note 54, at 733 (subjective
standard precludes application of uniform standards). For example, by directing courts
to look behind professed neutral motives to find segregative results, use of the foresee-
ability standard counteracted the dilatory, evasive tactics of school authorities. School
boards and state legislatures devised "pupil placement" and "freedom of choice" plans in
efforts to maintain a segregated status quo. See P. BREST, PRocEssES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 494-502 (1975). See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW
471-97 (1973) (collecting cases that illustrate techniques used to vitiate compliance with
desegregation orders). Because such plans need express no explicit racial assignments,
school board members might expect such plans to be upheld under a subjective standard
due to the impossibility of adducing subjective evidence of their discriminatory intent.
Under the foreseeability standard, however, the effects of the plan are considered along
with expressed nondiscriminatory intentions. Because use of objective data allows for cer-
tainty and uniformity of judicial response, the likelihood that evasive plans will be
rejected is increased.
58. The magnitude of the problem is demonstrated by the large number of court
desegregation orders that have been issued. See Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and
Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485,
552 (1978) (Fifth Circuit issued 166 school opinion orders from Dec. 2, 1969 to Sept. 24,
1970).
59. Cf. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971) (upholding
antibusing statute would render promise of Brown illusory). The Brown decision promised
equal educational opportunity to all children regardless of race, although the best way
to achieve that equality has been subject to myriad interpretations. See Bell, Waiting on
the Promise of Brown, 39 LAiw & CoNrEmNp. PROB. 341 (1975).
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by this prospect, the Supreme Court has voided state antibusing and
school redistricting laws because those laws impeded school board
progress in desegregation.60 In reaching those decisions, the Court
recognized no difference between school boards and legislatures when
the action under scrutiny resulted in maintaining segregated schools. 6
Furthermore, courts apply strict scrutiny to charges of racial dis-
crimination regardless of the nature of the defendant.62 Courts consis-
tently have invalidated southern state legislation aiding nonpublic
schools through tuition grant, tax, and loan programs under the equal
protection clause 63 for having the "end and necessary effect" of estab-
lishing and maintaining segregated school systems. 64 Neutral legislative
purposes have not saved such legislation otherwise found unconstitu-
60. See United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972) (invali-
dating statute creating new school district); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann,
402 U.S. 43 (1971) (invalidating antibusing statute); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710
(W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd mem., 402 U.S. 935 (1971) (same).
61. United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1972); North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971). Although these cases con-
centrated on effects without applying the foreseeability standard, the Supreme Court
subsequently adopted foreseeability to prove school board intent. Columbus Bd. of Educ.
v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2950 (1979). Foreseeability should be applied to both school
boards and legislatures, just as the effects test has been.
62. Although the Court shows special deference to Congress elsewhere, it has never
been suggested that deference is applicable to questions of racial discrimination, particular-
ly in the area of schools. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 41, at 13 (racially discriminatory govern-
mental action unquestionably justifies judicial intervention). The Court has found "un-
thinkable" the proposition that racial discrimination becomes any more tolerable when
it originates with Congress. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Furthermore, the
Court, using strict scrutiny, has consistently invalidated facially neutral legislative classi-
fications that masked invidious racial discrimination. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969) (invalidating city charter prohibiting any ordinance dealing with racial discrimina-
tion in housing); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating state constitution
prohibiting state interference in any personal arrangements to buy or sell real property).
In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny and
extend Hunter v. Erickson to a state constitution's wealth classification that prohibited
construction of low-income housing without a referendum. Tuition tax credits should not
be viewed as creating wealth classifications. As the Note argues, the credit's specific educa-
tional goals are so closely related to existing school segregation that, as in Reitman v.
Mulkey, the legislation, although facially neutral, is better viewed as distinguishing be-
tween taxpayers on the basis of race. Moreover, the Note contends that with careful
revision the tax credit would avoid its segregative impact and thereby could validly be
enacted despite its implications of distinctions based on wealth.
63. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (textbook loans); Poindexter v.
Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd Per
curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968) (tuition grants); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964) (enjoining tax credit program).
64. Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 686, 688 (E.D.
La.), aff'd sub nom. Louisiana Educ. Comm'n for Needy Children v. Poindexter, 393 U.S.
17 (1968); see Coffey v. State Educ. Finance Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (S.D. Miss.
1969) (grants fostered creation of private segregated schools).
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tional.65 Because the Court does not distinguish between equal pro-
tection analysis under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,66 similar
segregative effects from federal tax benefits should receive similar
treatment.67 Although courts traditionally have shown deference toward
tax legislation,66 they will not construe the tax code, or benefits derived
from it, so as to result in ends contrary to public policy.69
65. See Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 686, 690-
91 (E.D. La.), aff'd sub nom. Louisiana Educ. Comm'n for Needy Children v. Poindexter,
393 U.S. 17 (1968) (revisions in state tuition grant program to include facially neutral
statutory purpose did not alter unconstitutionality of program that had segregative effect).
The courts in southern tuition grant cases appear more concerned with the effects of a
program on the racial balance of a public school system than with the discriminatory
policies per se of individual private schools. See King, Rebuilding the "Fallen House"-
State Tuition Grants for Elementary and Secondary Education, 84 H~Av. L. REv. 1057,
1063 (1971).
66. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.") This view of
the two amendments was first enunicated with respect to school segregation. See Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Federal action merits special deference only when an
overriding "national interest" is at stake. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,
99-105 (1976) (restrictions on alien employment in civil service would merit deference if
ordered by President or Congress); Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal
Protection, 55 N.C.L. Rv. 542 (1977). Tax credit proposals do not incorporate such an
interest.
67. Tax deductions and credits are considered equivalent to direct government ex-
penditures by courts, commentators and Congress itself. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338
F. Supp. 448, 456 n.37 (D.D.C. 1972); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy, 83 HARv. L. Rxv. 705, 706 (1970); 31 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3) (1976).
68. See, e.g., Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940) (long-recognized, broad
discretion granted to legislative classifications in field of taxation).
69. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) (tax deduction
for fines disallowed because it would contravene public policy); Green v. Connally, 330
F. Supp. 1150, 1161-64 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971)
(IRS cannot grant tax-exempt status to segregated schools; invokes rule of Tank Truck
Rentals that tax code not frustrate public policy); cf. Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and
Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 76 (1972)
(while criticizing McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), makes exception
for Green because abundance of evidence supports Green theory that segregated educa-
tional facilities contravene public policy). In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court deferred to state taxing policies that resulted in
unequal funding of public school districts and held that strict judicial scrutiny was not
necessary. The decision offers no precedent for deference to a legislative judgment con-
cerning private school financing by tax credits. Rodriguez arose in the context of a long-
established local tax policy as to the sources of public school financing. 411 U.S. at 40-44,
53-54. The tuition tax credit, by contrast, is novel federal legislation that will have a
broad impact on national education policies. Moreover, Rodriguez was not decided on the
basis of racial discrimination, but rather involved allegations as to wealth discrimination,
id. at 18-29, and violations of a fundamental interest in education, id. at 29-39. The
public policy tax cases demonstrate that courts do not defer to tax statutes when racial
discrimination is involved. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972);
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971). The tuition tax credit therefore demands the strict scrutiny accorded
state programs for private school aid, see notes 63-65 supra (discussing cases), and not the
deference accorded to tax programs in Rodriguez.
Moreover, this Note ultimately evaluates the tax credit as legislation formulating educa-
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The affirmative duty of Columbus and Dayton operates so as to im-
pose a correlative duty on legislators not to inhibit school board
desegregation programs, at least until dual school systems are com-
pletely eradicated.70 Consideration of the effects of legislative proposals
on school desegregation would satisfy the legislative obligation to re-
frain from impinging on the elimination of dual school systems. If
evidence of foreseeably segregative consequences was not utilized to
evaluate congressional intent, it would lead to an anomalous result:
federal legislation could undermine Court decisions implementing the
mandate of Brown, yet state legislation with equivalent effects could
not.71 By holding legislatures responsible for the anticipated effects of
tion policy and not tax policy. See note 72 infra (establishing limits on foreseeability
as applied to Congress). Thus it does not raise the specter of judicial invalidation of
all tax laws under the equal protection clause, which concerned the Court in Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (impact test would require invalidation of whole
range of tax and welfare statutes).
70. The fact that a legislature may have had no institutional nexus with active school
discrimination in 1954, whereas a school board presumably has institutional continuity
and thereby is linked to 1954, cannot enter into the Court's calculus of affirmative duty,
because such a distinction would undermine any judicial ability to enforce the mandate
of Brown. See note 48 supra (suggesting use of foreseeability independent from finding of
continuing duty). If the duty of Brown was fulfilled, and a former dual school system was
truly disestablished, then a different approach to legislative responsibility toward school
desegregation from that adopted by this Note might be justified. While constructing a
legislative duty "not to resegregate" might be possible, it is beyond the scope of this Note;
given the currently remote possibility of achieving such a system, see pp. 184-85 infra
(discussing racial composition of enrollment patterns), it is unnecessary to be concerned
about legislation enacted under conditions of complete disestablishment.
71. See pp. 179-80 supra (state legislation impeding desegregation invalidated). In
this respect, Brown's prohibition of segregated schools imposes limits on the extent to
which Congress can pursue pluralism as a permissible goal in educational policy. Cf. p.
186 infra (one purpose of tax credit is to further educational pluralism).
Parallel treatment between the federal and state governments is strengthened by the
fact that Congress has taken an increasingly active role in education, which was tradi-
tionally considered solely within the realm of local government. See Williams, American
Education and Federalism, in GOVERNMENT IN THE CLASSROOM 1, 1-3 (M. Williams ed.
1978). Federal aid to education grew approximately 10-fold from 1960-1975, and the
number of federal educational programs multiplied correspondingly. Burnes, A Case
Study of Federal Involvement in Education, in GOVERNMENT IN THE CLASSROOM, supra, at
87. The federal share of public school revenues increased from $.6 billion in 1959-60 to
$5.3 billion in 1975-76, while the percentage of local funding out of total revenues de-
creased from 56.5% to 48.4%. E. COHN, THE EcONOMICS OF EDUCATION 9 (rev. ed. 1979).
The Office of Education's budget grew from $477 million in 1963 to $5.5 billion in 1973.
Dollar, Federal Attempts to Change the Schools, in GOVERNMENT IN THE CLAssRoOM, supra,
at 109. This expansion was accompanied by a growing federal role in funding educational
research and development. Id. at 115. The recent establishment of a Department of
Education further reflects this increasing federal involvement in formulating educational
policy. See Pub. L. No. 96-88, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This active and expanding
federal role in framing educational policies justifies imposing requirements on Congress
similar to those imposed on states and school boards, the traditional formulators of
educational policy.
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their decisions through judicial evaluation of legislative intent,72 courts
can ensure that legislation does not undo court and school board efforts
to desegregate schools. Clearly, congressional action that threatens to
vitiate remedies for racially segregative decisions of school officials
cannot be permitted if Brown is to have lasting force.
III. Applying the Foreseeability Standard:
The Case Against the Credit
Inferring intent from the foreseeable consequences of the tuition tax
credit entails a multistep evidentiary process.7 3 The tax credit's racially
disproportionate impact must first be demonstrated. Then, the credit's
segregative consequences must be shown to have been reasonably fore-
seeable to Congress. Because this two-stage proof of evidence of foresee-
ability does not of itself establish intent, it is necessary to consider
further whether Congress had notice of the segregative impact and
whether any reasonable alternative policy with a less segregative effect
can meet the congressional objectives that underlie enactment of a
credit.
72. As the foreseeability standard is developed and defined within the area of educa-
tion, the scope of its applicability to congressional decisions should be limited to those
actions that have a direct educational objective. General economic and social legislation
only indirectly affect schools, cf. J. CooNs, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 7 (1970) (discrimination in education is direct, anticipated con-
sequence of government action whereas slum housing, illness, malnutrition, and other
aspects of poverty are not), and thus need not be invalidated by adopting this standard.
Moreover, foreseeability was expansively used in the school desegregation cases and gen-
erally has not been applied successfully in other equal protection areas. Cf. Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979) (upholding veteran's preference despite evidence
of foreseeable consequences adverse to women). The use of foreseeability in the Dayton
and Columbus school desegregation cases was considered by the Court to be in accord
with Feeney. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2950 (1979).
Congress could, of course, expand the limited scope of the foreseeability standard by
requiring consideration of the social impact of any tax legislation on segregation in schools.
Congress requires consideration of the economic incidence of all tax legislation in the tax
expenditure budget. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
31 U.S.C. §§ 11(e), 1302(a)(3), 1329(a)(2), 1329(c)(3) (1976). The secondary social effects of
legislative incentives are of no less importance. Cf. J. COLEMAN, S. KELLY, & J. MOORE,
TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION 1968-1973, at 40 (1975) (criticizing governments for con-
sidering indirect effects of economic policy but not of social policy).
73. See pp. 174, 176-77 & note 56 supra (discussing evidentiary process). A lawsuit
challenging the credit probably would seek to enjoin the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service from granting tax credits. Possible plaintiffs might include black public
school children or public school boards themselves. Standing to sue would not be a problem
because either school children or school officials would have a far more direct interest than
the interest of federal taxpayers generally in tax incentive programs. See Note, Denial of
Tax Exempt Status to Southern Segregation Academies, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 179,
184 nA0 (1970); cf. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963) (school
children had standing to challenge Bible-reading in public school because they were
"directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints [were] directed').
HeinOnline -- 89 Yale L.J. 183 1979-1980
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 168, 1979
A. The Credit's Foreseeable Impact and Congressional Intent
The legislation's context-the current trend to racially isolated school
systems evidenced by enrollment patterns in public and private schools
-must first be examined in order to assess the seriousness of the credit's
impact on schools. Congressional action that may foster such a tendency
should be evaluated with the recognition that present levels of school
desegregation do not yet even approach fulfilling the promise of Brown.
1. Current Trends in Student Enrollments
Public school enrollment patterns currently manifest an increasing
concentration of black students and a reciprocal decline in the number
of white students in the largest school districts.74 Desegregation gains
in recent years have occurred primarily in the South and in smaller
school districts.75 In every region outside the South, most black students
attend schools with minority enrollments of approximately seventy-five
percent.76 Even in the South, the impact of court-ordered desegregation
has been reduced by the proliferation of segregationist private schools
that offer a haven for white parents seeking to avoid integration .
7
74. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION 6-10 (1977); Bins & Townsel, changing/Declining Enrollments in Large City
School Systems, in DECLINING ENROLLMENTS, supra note 1, at 138-42. The enrollment
pattern parallels the increasing minority group concentration in the urban population.
See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra, at 11; Bins & Townsel, suPra, at 130-38. In
the future, a continuing minority influx into the cities, a white exodus into the suburbs
and the comparatively low fertility rate of white females suggest further concentration of
black children in urban public schools, even without aggravating factors such as a tax
credit. See Davis & Lewis, The Demographic Background to Changing Enrollments and
School Needs, in DECLINING ENROLLMENTS, supra note 1, at 34, 42.
75. See J. COLEMAN, S. KELLY, & J. MooRE, supra note 72, at 29-32, 37-39 (gains only
in South and, to lesser extent, Far West). The concentration of desegregation gains in the
South was partly the result of federal requirements, supported by court decisions aimed
at dismantling dual school systems, and partly the result of individual residential patterns
within districts which led to less segregation than in the North. There is less segregation
in the smaller districts generally because of the smaller concentration of blacks in these
districts. See also M. GOLLADAY & J. NOELL, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 1978, at 70-71
(1978) (racial isolation increased in Northeast public schools since 1970).
76. M. GOLLADAY & J. NOELL, supra note 75, at 70. In both the Northeast and Midwest
over 80% of black children attend schools in which minority students predominate. In
the West and border states, the percentage is approximately 73%. In the South, however,
the percentage is noticeably smaller, 55.6%. Id.
77. See D. NEVIN & R. BILLS, THE SCHOoLs THAT FEAR BUILT: SEGREGATIONIST ACADEMIES
IN THE SOUTH 1-3 (1976); Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436,
1441-53 (1973). Events in Jackson, Mississippi provide a particularly striking example of
the growth of segregationist academies. Between 1969 and 1976 public school enrollment
in Jackson dropped from 54% white to 31% white, while private school enrollment
flourished. D. NEVIN & R. BILLS, supra, at 3. This decline immediately followed the
Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19
(1969) (requiring immediate end to dual school systems) and the Fifth Circuit's decision
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The continuing and growing presence of segregationist academies
demonstrates how private schools may be used to blunt attempts to
integrate public school systems. Overtly segregationist schools, how-
ever, are only part of the larger problem of an inability to effectively
integrate the private educational sector voluntarily. Although black
children represent almost sixteen percent of the total school-age popula-
tion,78 they comprise only five percent of the total private school en-
rollment39 Thus their presence in private schools has, at best, a negligi-
ble effect on the student body in the private sector.
The confluence of these public school enrollment trends and the
racial composition of private schools creates a dual national educational
system of predominantly black urban public schools and predominantly
white private and suburban public schools.8 0 Fulfillment of the duty
that Brown imposed on school boards to desegregate is severely
threatened by these attendance patterns. This evidence of a national
dual school system provides the critical backdrop for analyzing the
credit's foreseeable impact.
2. Establishing Discriminatory Intent
The primary beneficiaries of the proposed tuition tax credit are
middle- and upper-income families.81 Since black families are severely
implementing Alexander, Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d
1211 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (per curiam). Cf. Coffey v. State Educ. Finance Comm'n,
296 F. Supp. 1389, 1391 & 1391 nn.5-7 (S.D. Miss. 1969) (per curiam) (judicial notice of
relationship between public school districts undertaking desegregation and growth of
private Schools). Because school systems in many areas of the South are county-wide, leaving
a desegregating public school system in the South may require either moving out of the
county or leaving public school altogether, unlike the typical northern option of moving
to a neighboring suburb. See J. COLEMAN, S. KELLY, & J. MooRE, supra note 72, at 54.
Southern segregationist or "protest" schools account for approximately one-sixth of the
nation's nonpublic elementary and secondary school enrollment. Erickson, Nault, & Cooper,
suPra note 1, at 107 (assumes most protest schools were included in count of schools with
religious affiliations included in study, relying on D. Nevin & R. Bills' estimate of 750,000
students in such schools). If northern segregationist schools are included, the figure rises
to at least one-fifth of the total nonpublic school enrollment. Id.; see MASSACHUSETTS RE-
SEARCH CENTER, EDUCATION AND ENROLLMENTS IN BOSTON DURINC PHASE II 80 (1976) (during
Boston desegregation, private school enrollment either increased or declined more slowly
than that of public schools).
78. Davis & Lewis, supra note 74, at 34.
79. See M. GOLLADAY, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 1977, at 190, 192 (1977).
80. Cf. RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 47, at 31 ("Private and parochial school enroll-
ment, which is overwhelmingly white, also is a significant factor in the increasing separa-
tion of white and Negro school children.") (footnote omitted).
81. Seventy-five percent of the benefits of the tax credit would have gone to families
with annual incomes over $15,000; only 9% of the benefits would have gone to families
with incomes under $10,000 and 16% would have gone to families with incomes between
$10,000 and $15,000. 124 CONG. REC. S13,122 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (reprinting estimates
of Joint Tax Comm. prepared July 31, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Estimates].
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underrepresented in these income groups, 82 a higher percentage of
white than black families will be likely to use the credit. Because the
tax credit will therefore maintain or even accelerate the current sys-
temic pattern of segregation in educational enrollments, it has a dis-
proportionate racial impact on schools.
The foreseeability of these results is evident from the structure of
the bill. The express purposes of the credit were to further parental
freedom of choice and pluralism in education while providing tax relief
for the double educational expenses of middle-income parents.
83 The
credit was explicitly intended to function as an incentive device for the
use of alternative nonpublic educational systems.
8 4 In congressional
debate, speakers predicted that taxpayers would use the credit to shift
their children from public to private schools, or to meet the escalating
82. Median income for black families in 1977 was $9,485, compared to a median 
in-
come of $16,782 for white families. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 457 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS]. Thus,
most black families are in the income groups that receive a total of 9% of the expected
benefits of the credit. See note 81 supra (discussing breakdown of benefits). Only 10.8%
of all nonwhite families have incomes of $25,000 or more, as compared to 23.9% of all
white families. CENSUS, supra, at 452. These higher income groups receive more than one-
third of the credit's benefits. See Estimates, supra note 81. The racial skew of the benefits
is aggravated by the nonrefundable nature of the credit. See p. 188 infra (proposing
refundability as remedy for segregative effect).
Although one commentator has testified that the credit will enable poorer families to
attend nonpublic schools and thereby increase minority enrollment in the private sector,
see Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 162-70 (statement of Thomas Vitullo-Martin), there
is no data to indicate that low-income families will be more likely than wealthier families
to take advantage of the credit.
The skewing of benefits to middle- and upper-income groups by the tax credit would,
in fact, produce the worst kind of "integration" in school systems-one based on homo-
geneous student wealth levels. Children of affluent families will be classmates in private
schools and only the children of lower income groups will remain as classmates in public
schools. Research has suggested that the more significant factor in the academic achieve-
ment of black children attending integrated schools is not the racial balance of the class-
room itself, but rather the socio-economic status of the child's family and classmates. See
J. COLEMAN Er AL., supra note 47, at 302, 325; cf. J. BURKHEAD, INPUT AND OUTPUT IN
LARGE-CITY HIGH SCHOOLS 88 (1967) (most important finding in study is that variations in
educational outcomes as measured by test scores wholly conditioned by socio-economic
environment of neighborhood). The tax credit's effect of furthering socio-economic class
stratification clearly would vitiate the benefits to be derived from public school desegrega-
tion.
83. See, e.g., 124 CONG. RFc. S13,113 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (statement of Sen. Pack-
wood); 124 CONG. REC. H4734-35 (daily ed. June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Frenzel).
84. See notes 85 & 86 infra. Tax credits are often intended to function as incentive
devices. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, 1976-3 C.B. 177 (vol. 2) (movie and TV film investment credit is "further
incentive to encourage U.S. production"); [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1928-29
(to achieve goal of congressional work incentive program of employing welfare recipients,
credit adopted as "specific tax incentive for employers who hire individuals under . . .
program").
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costs of maintaining their children in private schools.85 Congress thus
readily foresaw the very mechanism of the credit's segregative impact:
providing economic subsidies for continued attendance in, and transfer
to, nonpublic schools.
In addition, the structure of the bill's benefits evidences an aware-
ness that by limiting the legislation's subsidy to higher income groups,
the credit disproportionately favored the movement of whites out of
the increasingly black public schools and into the overwhelmingly
white private system.86 Furthermore, several members of Congress
recognized the potential segregative impact of the credit in the debate
over the billyt This chain of inferences firmly establishes not only that
the credit's segregative effect was reasonably foreseeable, but also that
Congress had notice of that consequence. Enactment despite the warn-
ing of the bill's segregative effect supplies strong evidence of im-
permissible intent.
Discriminatory intent would be established if, in addition to this
evidence of foreseeably segregative impact and congressional notice of
that effect, it was demonstrated that there were available possible
revisions or alternative programs that would mitigate the segregative
effect of the tax credit legislation and still fulfill the objectives of
educational pluralism and tax relief.88 In fact, several such alternative
proposals were available to Congress. These alternatives are broadly
distinguishable on the basis of the focus of revision: an individual-
recipient approach that would redefine the income beneficiary class
85. See, e.g., note 86 infra (quoting Sen. Stafford); 124 CONG. Rac. H4735 (daily ed.
June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Frenzel) ("We simply believe those parents who are
willing to make a particular sacrifice ought to get a little encouragement so that they
can continue to do so.")
86. This was explicitly noted by Senator Stafford:
To the extent that we create an incentive for parents to move their children to
private schools, the resulting action would involve whites very disproportionately....
I am wary that tax credits will tend to be resegregative in their effect. It would be
very inconsistent of our Government to demand public school integration in the
pursuit of equal opportunity and at the same time create financial incentives to any
degree which would work against that objective. . . . We have some excellent recent
data .... which provide some perspective on these considerations. One-fourth of the
children from families with incomes above $50,000 were in private schools, as were
17 percent of all children from families with incomes above $25,000, but only 4 per-
cent of all children from families with incomes below $5,000. While 17 percent of all
white children attend private schools, only 5 percent of all minority children do.
124 CONG. Rac. S13,124 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
87. See, e.g., 124 CONG. Rac. H4757 (daily ed. June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Mitchell
(Md.)) (credit will lead to resegregation); id. at H4749 (statement of Rep. Anderson) (effect
of credit is promotion of segregation).
88. See pp. 176-77 sukra (discussing additional factors needed to show intent).
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and an institutional approach that would restrict the range of private
schools at which taxpayers could use the credit.
Two suggestions for restructuring the credit by redefining the bene-
ficiary class have been proposed: refundable credits and income ceil-
ings.8 9 A refundable credit provides that when a taxpayer's liability is
less than the amount that he would be entitled to as a credit, he receives
the difference as a cash refund. Income ceilings limit eligibility for
claiming a credit to taxpayers whose adjusted gross incomes are below
a determined level. These provisions would reduce the credit's present
tendency to skew benefits toward higher income families. They would
allow for greater participation by black families, who are more heavily
represented among low-income groups, and thus would tend to lessen
the legislation's segregative effect. A credit that progressively increased
in amount in inverse correlation to income level would have a similar
effect.
In addition to provisions focusing on the recipients, restrictions
might be placed on institutional eligibility. The legislation itself re-
quired the taxpayer to attend a school that qualifies for tax-exempt
status.90 The drafters hoped to thereby exclude families utilizing
segregationist academies because such schools cannot receive tax exemp-
tions.91 The Internal Revenue Service, however, has been unable to
89. See S.2142, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(b) (1977), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra
note 3, at 48 (refundability provision). Senators Packwood and Moynihan planned to
introduce an amendment to include refundability. 124 CONG. REc. S13,201 (daily ed. Aug.
14, 1978); see note 82 supra (discussing effect of nonrefundability on low-income taxpayers).
Senator Metzenbaum introduced an amendment to phase out the credit as adjusted gross
income exceeds $30,000 but the amendment was defeated. See 124 CONG. REC. S13,359-63
(daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978). His amendment was directed only to college level credits.
90. H.R. 12050, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(f)(4)(B), 124 CONG. REc. H4765 (daily ed. June
1, 1978).
91. Proponents of the tuition tax credit claim that the eligibility requirement that the
school must be exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
excludes segregationist academies as tax credit beneficiaries, following Green v. Connally,
330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mein. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (IRS
may not grant tax exempt status to segregated private schools); Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1
C.B. 158 (enforcing Green as to religious schools); Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230
(enforcing Green); Rev. Pro. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587 (guide to compliance with revenue
rulings enforcing Green). See, e.g., 124 CONG. Rac. H4759 (daily ed. June 1, 1978) (state-
ment of Rep. Frenzel).
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Supreme Court held that a state
cannot compel attendance at public schools. Yet private associational rights can collide
with the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of governmental encouragement of private
racial discrimination. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 462 (D.D.C. 1972). Thus,
private schools and organizations that discriminate among applicants on the basis of race
are ineligible to receive government funds or to be granted tax exemptions. See Mc-
Glotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (tax benefit); Green v. Connally, 330
F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), afj'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (tax
benefit); notes 63-65 supra (discussing state grant cases); cf. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601,
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effectively monitor institutional compliance with regulations requiring
nondiscriminatory admissions policies for tax-exempt status.92 More-
over, an individuated institutional remedy would not lessen the credit's
segregative impact on the nation's increasingly dual educational struc-
ture. Thus, the effectiveness of the current legislation's institutional
method to reduce the credit's segregative effect is negligible.
It is possible, however, to readily formulate other, more effective
institutional eligibility restrictions. Taxpayer use of credits could be
limited to schools with a specified minimum proportion of minority
students.9 3 This ratio could be determined by either a uniformly re-
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (organizations receiving federal financial assistance may not
discriminate).
This problem of public funding restrictions and the conflict between First Amendment
associational rights and the Fourteenth Amendment is solved in the case law by the
revocation of the benefit accorded the particular institution. This would be too narrow
a remedy to resolve the segregative effect of tuition tax credits. The constitutional danger
lies not only in the discriminatory policies of individual schools but also in the broader
impact of the tax credit program on nationwide patterns of attendance in public versus
nonpublic schools.
92. See D. NEvIN & R. BILLS, supra note 77, at 15-16. Although the IRS has been en-
joined from issuing tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi without first taking
precautionary measures to ensure that the school does not discriminate, Green v. Connally,
330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), the
effectiveness of these measures is dubious. Seven Mississippi schools currently have tax-
exempt status but have been barred from receiving state assistance under other federal
court decisions because of racially discriminatory policies. See Memorandum to Rep.
Shirley Chisholm from the United States Commission on Civil Rights 11 (May 16, 1978) (on
file with Yale Law Journal). Furthermore, many of the newer segregationist schools can
meet the current IRS guidelines and still maintain their original segregated character.
D. NEVIN & R. BILLS, supra note 77, at 17. Current guidelines in Rev. Pro. 75-50, 1975-2
C.B. 587, award exemptions primarily on the basis of the school's own statements and
advertising of nondiscriminatory policies. The IRS recently proposed more definitive
guidelines to identify discriminatory schools. Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private
Tax-Exempt Schools, 43 FED. REG. 37,296 (Aug. 22, 1978) (hearings held week of Dec. 5,
1978). Unless a private school could meet various good-faith criteria, these guidelines would
have denied it exempt status if it (1) opened simultaneously with the desegregation of
local public schools and (2) enrolled a percentage of minority students less than 20% of
their proportion in the community. This proposal drew such vigorous protest that the
IRS subsequently modified it. Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt
Schools, 44 FED. REG. 9451 (Feb. 13, 1979) (eliminating 20% requirement and easing private
school good-faith demonstration); see The New Haven Register, Feb. 10, 1979, at 19, col.
I (proposal drew most letter complaints in IRS history). This subsequent dilution of the
proposed requirements undercuts their effectiveness even if there is adequate enforcement.
See also 124 CONG. REC. S13,212 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1978) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (in-
adequacy of IRS enforcement). Moreover, Congress amended the Treasury Department
appropriations bill for fiscal year 1980 to prevent promulgation of these, or any other,
new enforcement procedures. Pub. L. No. 96-74, tit. I, § 103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
93. Cf. note 92 supra (IRS proposal of 20% guideline for tax-exempt status of schools).
Such guidelines do not violate the murky proscriptions of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (certain special minority admissions programs in professional
schools unconstitutional). Bakke can be distinguished from guidelines limiting institutional
eligibility for tax credits by the nature of the "good" involved. Admission to institutions of
higher education, and particularly professional schools, allocates a scarce commodity. Thus,
189
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quired percentage of minority students or a percentage keyed to
minority representation within the school's adjacent community.
9 4
These restricted credits would minimize the possibility of a segregative
effect by allowing the subsidy for private school attendance to be used
only at schools that countered the current trend to racial isolation in
public and private schools.
Institutional eligibility rules would provide more direct assurance
that the credit would not be transformed into a device to avoid in-
tegration than would tinkering with individual taxpayer eligibility;
institutional restrictions are more easily enforced than controls on in-
dividuals. Moreover, although both recipient and institutional adjust-
ments reduce the credit's segregative effect, a combination of the two
would be a more effective safeguard against segregation than either
method taken separately. 5 Combination would ensure both greater
individual participation by black families and continuing institutional
efforts to maintain integrated enrollments.
Congress also could restructure the incentive feature of the tax credit
to minimize the current trend toward a national dual school system.
The amount of the credit could be scaled to increase if the taxpayer's
child attends a school where he is in the racial minority, or if he attends
a school with a specified minimum level of minority enrollment.", Such
an incentive system would enhance the attainment of the existing
congressional goals: it both preserves individual educational choice
and provides tax relief, while including a financial bonus for attending
integrated schools. The incentive function of the credit would thus
the Court viewed the racial classification in Bakke as a racial preference limiting equality
of educational opportunity. Such scarcity does not characterize the elementary and
secondary school level at which the tax credit operates. See Fiss, supra note 35, at 8. See
also Johnson v. Board of Education, 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979) (racial quotas on enroll-
ments in desegregation plan constitutional).
94. See note 92 supra (IRS proposal). See also J. CooNs & S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION By
CHOIcE 126 (1978) (similar proposals developed to avoid segregative results in vouchei
plans).
95. Nor would individual freedom of choice and a measure of tax relief be impaired
by these refinements to the legislation. The restrictions on institutional eligibility may
infringe on the congressional goal of freedom of educational choice, but they would do
so only within the mandate of Brown, which limits the permissibility of pluralism as a
legitimate goal, see note 71 supra. Income ceilings would impinge on the congressional
goal of middle-class tax relief only where the ceiling was drawn at a low income level. In
such a case, alternative methods of tax relief that did not directly affect education could
be utilized to aid the middle-class family. A mix of the two alternatives, institutional and
income-beneficiary restrictions, thus maximizes sensitivity to congressional goals while
minimizing segregative effects.
96. See J. CooNs & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 94, at 126-27 (suggesting dollar incentives
for voucher plan).
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shift dramatically; rather than foster segregation, it would encourage
desegregation.
Any combination of these revisions, or any one of them alone, would
result in a credit less segregative than the current proposal. The avail-
ability of alternatives, in conjunction with the inference drawn from
the credit's foreseeable consequences and congressional notice of the
segregative effect, establishes discriminatory intent. Because the current
legislation would be unconstitutional under this analysis, any recon-
sideration of the tuition tax credit would require modification to in-
corporate some mix of these less segregative alternatives. 97
B. A Constitutional Alternative to Tax Credits
There is a danger-perhaps even a likelihood-that schools will
remain segregated even under a revised credit program. Given the
disparity between the value of the credit and the cost of private educa-
tion, and given the existence of free public schools, lower income
groups-which include most black families-might well be unable to
shift into private school systems. The heavy concentration of black
children in public school systems would remain substantially un-
changed. For this reason, alternatives that could replace tax credits
entirely should be explored.
Federal grants to assist in implementing local educational voucher
systems offer one constitutional alternative to tax credits. 98 A voucher
system gives all parents a cash grant, or voucher, linked to the local
per-pupil cost of education, which parents then use to purchase educa-
tion at any school of their choice.99 Such a system would meet the
pluralist and desegregationist goals underlying the revised tax credit
scheme and yet be superior to a credit; by equalizing the per-pupil state
97. Evidence of the existence of still less segregative alternatives does not automatically
void a particular legislative choice; Congress need not choose the least segregative pro-
posal if it would not serve the specific goals of the original program. Thus, Congress need
not adopt the proposed "restructured incentive" credit in order to encourage school de-
segregation because the original goals of the credit were solely to promote tax relief and
educational pluralism. Because institutional restrictions clearly would be more effective
than individual recipient restrictions in reducing segregative effects, the intent criterion
of availability of alternatives would mandate congressional adoption of the institutional
restrictions; it would not, however, require the additional incorporation of individual
restrictions in the overall plan.
98. Congress has approved pilot voucher programs that were carried out under the
auspices of the Office of Economic Opportunity. The most famous of these was the pro-
gram in Alum Rock, California, in which only public schools participated. See E. COHN,
supra note 71, at 305. See also J. COONS & S. SUGAnMAN, supra note 94, at 214-17 (discussing
Alum Rock experiment). Because of the breadth of the class of beneficiaries-public and
nonpublic schools are included-voucher plans may avoid the question of unconstitution-
ality under the First Amendment. See L. TRaE, supra note 41, at 846 n.33.
99. See Areen, supra note 2, at 468-69, 471-76.
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subsidy going to private and public schools it would permit lower
income minority groups to enjoy full and equal participation in the
competition for educational services. 00 Furthermore, within the
voucher system, the distinction between public and private schools is
eliminated where both types of schools participate in the program.'
0
Vouchers would thereby satisfy the congressional concern for tax relief
from the double expenditures of paying taxes to support public schools
while paying tuition to attend private schools.
102
In the public controversy over educational alternatives, voucher
plans were proposed by commentators representing a wide range of
political views.' 0 3 To be constitutionally acceptable, however, the
voucher system, like the modified tax credit proposals, would require
participating institutions to observe minimum minority enrollment
requirements. 0 4 Moreover, financial bonuses to parents for their chil-
dren's attendance at integrated schools should be an integral com-
ponent of a voucher program. 0 5 This would guarantee that vouchers
provided no less an incentive to desegregate than a revised tax credit
plan.
In addition, because the use of vouchers effectively merges the two
100. The voucher subsidy could be adjusted according to family income. See J. CooNs
& S. SUGARMAN, supra note 94, at 194-96. The amount of tuition that participating schools
may charge could be limited to the amount of the voucher. Id. at 190-92. Schools that
charged tuition in excess of the voucher would not receive the government funding. See
note 106 infra.
101. Cf. E. COHN, supra note 71, at 305, 307 (implying that for voucher plan to be
effective, nonpublic schools must participate). The experimental voucher program spon-
sored by the Office of Economic Opportunity at Alum Rock, California, only involved
public schools, id. at 305, which limited the success of the program, Cohen & Farrar,
Power to the Parents?-The Story of Education Vouchers, 48 PUBLIC INTEREST 72, 83-86
(1977).
102. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. H4735 (daily ed. June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Frenzel)
(parents faced with "double burden" of paying tuition and paying rising property taxes
that finance public schools).
103. See, e.g., J. COONS 8, S. SUGARMAN, supra note 94, at xii (noting "strange bed-
fellows" that defy political classification among voucher advocates); Flygare, An Ab-
breviated Voucher Primer, 15 INEQUALITY EDUC. 53, 53-55 (1973) (summarizing four most
widely discussed voucher proposals, which include plans by commentators of varying
political persuasions such as Milton Friedman and Christopher Jencks).
104. See J. CooNs & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 94, at 126 (suggesting minority enrollment
percentage requirements for voucher schools); IRS Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private
Tax-Exempt Schools, supra note 92 (20% minority representation in community require-
ment for receiving tax exemption). Coons and Sugarman add a third technique to limit
segregation in addition to financial bonuses and the rule mandating a minimum per-
centage minority enrollment or disqualification for nonintegration: a rule that schools
must admit every applicant or use a lottery where too many applicants apply for ad-
mission. See J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 94, at 125-26. But cf. Coleman, Introduc-
tion to id. at xiv (expressing hesitation as to efficacy of Coons & Sugarman's systemic safe-
guards against segregation and stressing need for stronger constraints or incentives).
105. See J. CooNs & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 94, at 126-27 (suggesting use of "integra-
tion bonuses" and financial penalties to stimulate "racial mixing" in voucher schools).
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school systems, vouchers could affirmatively address the problem of
segregative patterns within public schools and between public and non-
public schools. The amount of the voucher must constitute a ceiling
on tuition rates that participating schools could charge in order to make
the voucher system effective; otherwise, segregative patterns would
reemerge in the system. 106 Moreover, attendance patterns determined
by residential segregation could be countered by a voucher system using
a magnet school program. In such a program, school districts participat-
ing in the voucher plan would replace neighborhood schools with
magnet schools that offered specialized programs and covered wider
geographical attendance zones than that of the neighborhood.,0 7
Transportation costs would have to be subsidized by the plan to ensure
that magnet schools were available to all students. 08
Under a voucher system, students would no longer be confined to
segregated neighborhood schools because the income-restrictive feature
of tax credits would be eliminated, as would assignment by residence.
A carefully structured voucher plan could thereby hasten achievement
of truly desegregated school systems. Because vouchers fulfill the same
objectives as tax credits but with foreseeably less segregative effect,
Congress, in formulating national educational policy, should focus on
the feasibility of implementing a voucher system rather than a revised
tax credit scheme.
106. Cf. id. at 190-91 (suggesting tuition limit). If there were no tuition ceiling,
wealthier families could supplement the voucher and send their children to more ex-
pensive schools while poorer families would be forced to use the cheapest schools.
This would result in an economically stratified system that would offer a negligible
opportunity for integration, given the congruence of race and wealth, see notes 81 &
82 supra, as existing enrollment patterns demonstrate. Imposition of a ceiling would
undoubtedly result in some existing exclusive private schools choosing not to participate
in the voucher system so as to charge higher rates, but in that case, those schools and
their users would receive no public funding. Additionally, a new educational market
would have been created by the voucher system, and former users of those schools would
be able to shift to other institutions. See Areen, supra note 2, at 475 (discussing voucher
plan tuition limits).
107. See EDUCATION AND ENROLLMENTS IN BOSTON DURING PHASE II, supra note 77, at 25,
53-56, 60 (reporting on successful use of magnet schools during Boston public school
desegregation and concluding that those schools achieved goal of attracting students to
voluntarily desegregated learning environments); cf. Calkins &- Gordon, The Right to
Choose an Integrated Education, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 171 (1974) (suggesting establish-
ment of voluntary, regional integrated schools, financed by partial voucher scheme).
Adopting a magnet school program under a tax credit system, however, would not have
much impact on segregation levels. Because tax credits leave intact the separation between
public and private schools, the magnet school program would only affect those children
choosing to remain in the public system who did not use the credit.
108. See E. COHN, sutra note 71, at 305 (suggesting free or subsidized transportation
in voucher plan). If costs were not subsidized, there would be no real free choice in the
voucher system and poorer black students would be restricted to existing segregated
neighborhood schools. The purpose of adopting the magnet school plan would thereby
be frustrated.
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